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In Search of a Role for the Legal System 
Fernando E. Agrait* 
The participants in this symposium are concerned about 
what appears to be a growing gap between the legal and moral 
orders of our society. Although the gap itself is a problem, more 
serious is the apparent lack of adequate mechanisms to deal 
with it. As our society grows more complex and shared values 
diminish, the greater the need becomes for mechanisms to de- 
velop those values. To this end we might ask: "Is there a role to 
be played by the legal system in identifying values and fostering 
consensus?" 
My thesis is that such a role exists for the legal system. I 
submit that the gap between the legal and moral orders is 
caused by the alienation of citizens. Failure to participate in the 
political process leads people to reject the values it espouses. 
This phenomenon is explained by a sociological model known as 
"equity theory." Under this model, the role of the legal system 
would be to eliminate barriers to participation, thus lessening 
alienation and closing the gap between the legal and moral 
orders. 
11. ALIENATION IN THE U.S. POLITICAL PROCESS 
A significant degree of political alienation exists in the 
United States.' It manifests itself particularly in a low degree of 
political participation.' Whereas 64 percent of the qualified vot- 
*B.B.A., 1967, L.L.B., 1970, University of Puerto Rico; L.L.M., 1971, Harvard Uni- 
versity. Assistant Professor of Law since 1971 at the University of Puerto Rico. Without 
the intellectual stimulation provided by Professor Richard Schwartz and the editorial 
help of Professor Michael Diamond, this paper would not have been prepared. 
1. See generally R. GILMORE & R. LAMB, POLITICAL ALIENATION IN CONTEMPORARY 
AMERICA 16-21 (1975); Aberback, Alienation and Voting Behavior Today, SOCIETY, July/ 
Aug. 1976, at 19; Finifter, Dimensions of Political Alienation, 64 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 389 
(1970); Yinger, Anomie, Alienation and Political Behavior, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PO- 
L ~ C A L  SCSENCE 171, 180 (1970). 
2. See Gans, The Empty Ballot Box: Reflections on Nonvoters in America, PUB. 
OPINION, Sept./Oct. 1978, at 54; Schwartz, Political Alienation, S o c m ,  JulyIAug. 1976, 
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ers voted in the 1960 presidential election, only 54.5 percent did 
in 1976. At the congressional level the decrease was from 46.3 
percent in 1962 to 38.2 percent in 1974.' Alienation is also indi- 
cated by opinion polls. From 1966 to 1977 there was a more than 
two-fold increase in the number of people expressing the opinion 
"leaders don't care what happens to you" (22 percent to 60 per- 
cent).' For the same period, an increase of 37 percent to 61 per- 
cent occurred in the opinion that "what you think doesn't 
C O U ~ ~ . " ~  
Another important manifestation of this alienation is the 
public's distrust of politicians, which has been increasing greatly 
in the United States.' One recent study found that "extreme po- 
litical alienation" had risen from 14.1 percent in 1960 and 23.3 
percent in 1972.' Such alienation was twice as high among 
blacks, women and citizens over 65.' Suprisingly, a high rate of 
alienation has recently appeared in higher income and education 
level groups as well.@ The alienated tend to withdraw from the 
political process, to marginally participate or even to abstain en- 
tirely. Such people are not intrinsically apathetic but need to be, 
and can be, mobilized by a charismatic figure, specific issues or a 
perception of real change.1° 
What can we do to deal with this problem? First, we must 
recognize that political alienation is a "reaction to perceived in- 
ability to influence events."ll This statement is consistent with 
the fact that participation has been found to be lower in large, 
urban areas,la where one person's voice counts for less. It is also 
consistent with the fact that one may be alienated in one field 
where he is ineffective, but be active in other fields where he is 
at 27. 
3. Gans, supra note 2, at 54. 
4. PUB. OPINION, MayIJune 1978, at 23. 
5. Id. 
6. See Citrin, Comment: The Political Relevance of Trust in Government, 68 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 973 (1974); Miller, Political Issues and T m t  in Government: 1964-1970, 
68 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 951 (1974); PUB. OPINION, Jan./Feb. 1979, at 24. 
7. R. GILMORE & R. LAMB, supra note 1, at  20. "Extreme political alienation" refers 
to persons who expressed political estrangement on at least seven out of nine survey 
questions. Id. at 19. 
8. Id. at  24-27, 53-55, 63-65. 
9. Id. at 47-49. 
10. See Nie & Verba, Political Participation, in 4 HANDBOOK F POLITICAL SCIENCE 
(1975). 
11. Yinger, supra note 1, at 180. 
12. Finifter, supra note 1, at 404. 
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effective? 
The equity theory provides a framework for understanding 
and solving the problem of alienation. An explanation of the 
theory appeared in an article by Walster, Berscheid and 
Walster: 
When individuals find themselves participating in inequitable 
relationships, they become distressed. The more inequitable 
the relationship, the more distress individuals feel. 
. . .[I]ndividuals participating in inequitable relationships 
. . . feel distress regardless of whether they are the victims or 
the beneficiaries of the inequity. . . . [Tlhose who receive less 
than they deserve feel distress (usually in the form of anger) 
. . . [and] those who receive more than they deserve feel dis- 
tress (usually in the form of guilt). 
. . . .  
Individuals who discover they are in an inequitable rela- 
tionship attempt to eliminate their distress by restoring equity. 
The greater the inequity that exists, the more distress they 
feel, and the harder they try to restore equity. 
There are two ways that a participant can restore equity to 
an inequitable relationship: He can restore actual equity to the 
relationship, or he can restore psychological equity. 
A participant can restore "actual equity" by appropriately 
altering his own outcomes or inputs or the outcomes or inputs 
of the other participants . . . . 
A participant can restore "psychological equity" by appro- 
priately distorting his perception of his own or his partner's 
outcomes and inputs.14 
Specifically, the victim can either fight to obtain compensa- 
tion (equity in fact) or accept and justify his suffering: 
Sometimes a victim finds that it is impossible either to 
elicit restitution or to retaliate against the harmdoer. The im- 
potent victim is then left with only two options: He can ac- 
knowledge that he is exploited and that he is too weak to do 
anything about it, or he can justify his exploitation. Often, vic- 
timized individuals find it less upsetting to distort reality and 
justify their victimization than to acknowledge that the world 
13. Yinger, supra note 1, at 189. 
14. Walster, Berscheid & Walster, New Directions in Equity Research, in 9 AD- 
VANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 6 (1976). 
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is unjust and that they are too impotent to elicit fair 
treatment? 
At least one Supreme Court Justice has recognized the pos- 
sibility of the sufferer accepting his condition. As stated by Pro- 
fessor Ely: 
The general idea is one that in some contexts has merit. A 
sufficiently pervasive prejudice can block its own correction not 
simply by keeping its victims "in the closet" but also by con- 
vincing even them of its correctness. In Castaneda u. Partida, 
[430 U.S. 482 (1977)], the Court held that a prima facie case of 
intentional discrimination against Mexican-Americans in the 
selection of grand jurors was not constitutionally affected by 
the fact that Mexican-Americans enjoyed "governing majority" 
status in the county involved. Concurring, Justice Marshall 
gave the reason why: "Social scientists agree that members of 
minority groups frequently respond to discrimination and 
prejudice by attempting to disassociate themselves from the 
group, even to the point of adopting the majority's negative 
attitudes towards the minority." Nor does this insight seem 
relevant only to numerical minorities: slaves outnumbered 
masters in the antebellum South, and outnumbered whites 
generally in some states, but that apparently didn't keep many 
of them from assimilating much of the mythology used to legit- 
imate their en~lavement.'~ 
IV. APPLICATION F THE EQUITY THEORY TO ALIENATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL PROCESS 
The high degree of alienation in today's political processes 
may be explained by the equity theory.17 We can theorize that 
people perceive their citizen-government relation as fundamen- 
tally inequitable, without reciprocity. People perceive that either 
they receive too little from government or they receive too 
much. Another perception might be that some people have too 
much access to the government, and others too little. 
Perceiving such inequities, the citizen may try to correct the 
imbalance or to justify it. One way to correct the imbalance is to 
actively participate in the process. But many citizens perceive 
the process as being closed to their input. They feel that cur- 
15. Id. at 25 (citation omitted). 
16. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 165-66 (1980). 
17. Adams & Freedman, Equity Theory Revisited: Comments and Annotated Bibli- 
ography, in 9 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 43 (1976). 
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rently there is no effective way by which an individual can 
meaningfully influence the process. Viewing as closed the oppor- 
tunity to actually reduce the inequity, the citizen rationalizes 
the inequity away. The rationalization might take the form of 
one of the following: "I am not part of that process," "They are 
all crooks," or "I don't count." Finding no equity in his relation 
with the government and believing the avenues closed for equal- 
izing the relation through participation, the citizen simply drops 
out. 
It is possible that the public has chosen to withdraw from 
both politicians and political institutions because the public was 
confronted with unacceptable conduct on the part of the politi- 
cians. To disassociate from those who misbehave can be seen as 
a positive decision not to be part of their activities.18 
Equity theory is consistent with studies made concerning 
citizen political participation. Kenneth Langton has concluded 
that belief in one's political efficacy varies from situation to situ- 
ation and the element of prior, positive experience is of great 
importance.lS The more equitable each relation to government 
has been, the more inclined a person will be toward equalizing 
future relations. However, if most of an individual's experiences 
have been negative, he will likely move toward inaction. 
Similarly, Wolfinger and Rosenstone indicate that the deci- 
sion to vote, just as any other major decision, involves a cost- 
benefit analysis? If the cost (in terms of time or foregone op- 
portunities) outweighs the benefits to be derived from govern- 
ment, then one will not participate. Accordingly, the perception 
of an incapacity to alter results or to have an impact will in- 
crease non-participation. 
Another study finds that the breakdown of political party 
organizations has eliminated an intermediary between the indi- 
vidual voter and the government. This produces a greater dis- 
tance between the two and reduces the voter's perception about 
18. In a different setting, the withdrawal from interaction is used as a sanction. See 
Schwartz, Social Factors in the Development of Legal Control: A Case Study of Two 
Israeli Settlements, 63 YALE L.J. 471, 490 & 11.26 (1954). 
19. K. LANGTON, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND LEARNING 21-23, 131, 134-35 (1980). 
20. R. WOLPINGER & S. ROSRNSTONE, WHO VOTES? 6-10, 87-88 (1980). 
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the degree to which his contribution can be felt." 
Anthropological studies also indicate that active participa- 
tion in the political process establishes reciprocal relations in the 
community. This reciprocity creates a stronger community and 
legal bond. The Ashantis in Africa2% and the Tobriand Islanders 
in the Pa~ific'~ illustrate this principle. Concerning anthropolog- 
ical studies Walster, Berscheid and Walster state: 
[Anthropological] authors observed that some societies have 
worked out exchange systems in which everyone can be both a 
donor and a receiver. (The kula ring is an example.) Harmoni- 
ous stable relations are said to be the result. They contrasted 
these societies with those in which no mechanisms for getting 
rid of obligations by returning gifts is provided. . . . Volatile 
and unpleasant relations are said to be the result of such con- 
tinuing inequities. . . . [Tlhe ability to reciprocate is an im- 
portant determinant of how nations will respond to help from 
their neighbod' 
Historical examples illustrate the relation between respect 
for the results of the process and participation in the political 
process. For example, colonial powers imposing their laws on the 
colonized confirms the low effectiveness of political systems es- 
tablished without participation? 
An examination of contemporary American subcultures con- 
firms the importance of group solidarity and social cohesion? 
Akin to the primitive experiences, we find in our modern society 
a similar development in what has been called "the culture of 
poverty."27 A deep sense of commitment to the group and active 
participation in the community helps the poor survive their eco- 
nomic misery. 
Jean Piaget's study of moral development in children also 
illustrates the principle of equal relations. He indicates that re- 
spect for authority and autonomy depends on reciprocity: 
21. N. Nm, S. VERBA & J. PBTROCIK, THE CHANGING AMERICAN V m  345-56 (1979). 
22. E. HOEBEL, THE LAW OF P R I ~  lMAN 211-54 (Atheneum ed. 1972). 
23. Id. at 177-210. 
24. Walster, Berscheid & Walster, supra note 14, at 29. 
25. Prof. Merlin Myers' comment to this paper, Utah Endowment for Hnmeni- 
ties-Brigham Young University Law School Symposium, in Provo, Utah (Oct. 25,1980). 
The American War for Independence is a prime instance of colonial rebellion because of 
lack of respect for the system. 
26. See generally E. HOW, supra note 22, at 67-254. 
27. 0 .  LEWIS, LA VIDA, at xlii (1966). See generally 0 .  LEWIS, ANTROPOLOGU DE LA 
POBREZA (1961). 
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It would seem, then, that the evolution of the answers with 
age marks a definite progress in the direction of reciprocity. 
Unilateral respect, the source of the absolute command, taken 
literally, yields the place to mutual respect, the source of moral 
understanding. . . . 
. . . .  
Autonomy therefore appears only with reciprocity, when mu- 
tual respect is strong enough to make the individual feel from 
within the desire to treat others as he himself would wish to be 
treated. 
. . . .  
The conclusion which we shall finally reach is that the 
sense of justice, though naturally capable of being reinforced 
by the precepts and the practical example of the adult, is 
largely independent of these influences, and requires nothing 
more for its development than the mutual respect and solidar- 
ity which holds among children themselves. . . . And as the 
solidarity between children grows we shall find this notion of 
justice gradually emerging in almost complete aut~nomy.'~ 
Why should we expect societies to behave differently than 
Piaget's children? Of the two examples cited earlier, the Ashan- 
tis lost their social effectiveness when their system became bu- 
reaucratic in nature and the sense of participation 
disappeared." 
Piaget's findings suggest that authority cannot be the sole 
source of reciprocal equity relations. Equitable relations grow 
when participation, cooperation and mutual respect exist.'O 
Moreover, greater participation in the process of government 
will develop if it is based on such cooperation and mutual 
respect. 
In summary, we have assumed that the equity theory can be 
applied to citizen-government relations. Under this theory, if 
citizens perceive their relation with government as being inequi- 
table, then the relation necessarily will create stress both in the 
citizens and in the government. In the process of eliminating 
such stress, citizens will either withdraw or move to equalize the 
relation. 
28. J. PIAGET, THE MORAL JUDGMENT OF THE CHILD 171, 196, 198 (2d ed. 1965). 
29. E. HOEBEL, supra note 22, at 231-34. 
30. See J. PIAGET, supra note 28, at 319. 
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VI. THE ROLE OF THE LEGAL SYSTEM IN SOLVING THE PROBLEM 
OF ALIENATION 
The legal system plays an important role in solving the 
problem of alienation. The road must be paved to facilitate a 
closer interrelationship between the citizen and his government. 
Participation must exist not only in the limited and important 
act of voting but also in the process of determining needs, estab- 
lishing priorities and solving problems. 
Under equity theory, the role of the courts is to remove any 
obstacle to political participation. One such obstacle is a lack of 
education about political processes, which education qualifies 
the person to participate in the governmental process. I am pro- 
posing that the courts should be activist-interventionist in those 
cases involving participation processes, particularly electoral 
processes. By opening up the process, then the courts could ab- 
stain or take a more passive role in intervening in particular 
value choices. Individual value choices should be left to the 
"marketplace of ideas," but only as long as it is a free market 
that is functioning normally. In addition, the court should main- 
tain a protective attitude when "discrete and insular minori- 
ties'"' are affected. Professor Ely observes: 
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeseking of trust, 
when (1) the ins are choking off the channels of political 
change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay 
out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote, 
representatives beholden to an effective majority are systemati- 
cally disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a 
prejudiced refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and 
thereby denying that minority the protection afforded other 
groups by a representative system.8g 
This view of the role of courts fits perfectly within the prin- 
ciples of the Constitution. No one can criticize the courts for 
opening up the participation process, because it is precisely that 
process which, if operating properly, will leave value decisions to 
the political arena and not to the c o u ~ t s . ~  
As more meaningful avenues of participation become availa- 
ble, more people will participate. The more effective each par- 
ticipatory experience becomes, the greater the participation will 
31. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
32. J. ELY, supra note 16, at 103. 
33. See id. at 87-88. 
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be in the future.a4 In addition, the courts will focus more on the 
process than on the particular results. This in turn will result in 
emphasis being placed on the morality of the process which after 
all is "the highest m~rality.'"~ 
Professor Sandalow's ideas mesh perfectly with this theory. 
He asserts that decisions by Congress and the states should be 
given substantial deference by the courts if those decisions are 
"deliberate and broadly based."a6 Such decisions are not merely 
evidence of societal norms, they are the ultimate source of the 
law's legitimacy in a democratic society. Deference to these deci- 
sions by the courts encourages political responsibility among the 
citizenry. Furthermore, the courts' recognition of the majority's 
will, when a decision is deliberate and broadly based, places 
courts in a better position to protect minorities. Professor 
Sandalow reasons: 
Accepting deliberate and broadly based political decisions 
as authoritative may . . . purchase a significant gain in the le- 
gitimacy of judicial efforts to protect minorities from the most 
serious hazards they confront in the political process and, in 
doing so, contribute substantially to the effectiveness of those 
efforts. The most serious threats to minorities, as a survey of 
the United States Reports will reveal, come from governmen- 
tal action that does not rest upon such decisions. . . . [Allso, 
experience demonstrates that state and local governments are 
typically less sensitive to minority interests than the Congress. 
Conventional constitutional analysis . . . regards the decision- 
making process that underlies challenged governmental action 
as irrelevant to the validity of that action. [As a result] it 
treats a determination that a local ordinance, a state statute, or 
inadequately considered federal legislation is unconstitutional 
as establishing that similar legislation subsequently enacted by 
Congress would also be invalid, however deliberate might be 
the process leading to its enactment. Courts are thus led to ap- 
proach the former with a deference they do not deserve. Doc- 
trines that would permit courts to take account of differences 
in the decisionmaking processes leading to challenged govern- 
mental action would, thus, contribute to the courts' ability to 
protect minorities in those situations in which that protection 
is most likely to be needed. But . . . the analysis that leads to 
34. See Finifter, supra note 1, at 400, K. LANGTON, supra note 19, at 22-23, 131. 
35. A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 123 (1975). 
36. Sandalow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 WCH. L. REV. 1162, 1186-95 
(1977). 
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taking account of such differences also requires that courts 
must defer finally to deliberate decisions by broadly represen- 
tative political  institution^.^^ 
Besides serving as guarantors of the accessability of the pro- 
cess, the courts can also serve as a catalyst for mobilization. 
Scheingold states that "it is possible to capitalize on the percep- 
tion of entitlement associated with rights to initiate and to nur- 
ture political m~bilization."~ The courts are in an ideal position 
to capitalize on entitlement. 
A model could be constructed to evaluate legislative, judi- 
cial and other government decisions in terms of the participation 
effect they will have. In the same manner that cost-benefit ratios 
are calculated and environmental impact statements are pre- 
pared, this model would measure the extent to which a particu- 
lar scheme will increase or hinder the participatory process. The 
effect on participation would be considered of prime importance 
even if the result be less "efficient" government. 
It should be clear that participation in the sense it is used 
here means much more than merely voting. It includes establish- 
ing or eliminating units of government in order to create a direct 
relation among the citizens, their input and the results. Clearly, 
certain government services will always exist which require cen- 
tral (as opposed to local) operation, regardless of the high cost of 
nonparticipation. Two examples are foreign relations and de- 
fense. But even in those instances, participation could be in- 
creased by allowing input on particular policies or by making 
certain information available to the public. The Vietnam War is 
an example of what can happen when little congruence exists 
between a foreign policy and the beliefs of the citizens. Actual 
physical participation is also important. In defense, a more in- 
tense use of state militia could help resolve the lack of motiva- 
tion in today's army. 
Under equity theory, the role of the legislature should also 
undergo change. I would call this new role "zero-based govern- 
ment bureaucracy legislation." Its aim would be to identify the 
units of government that most directly relate to the people af- 
fected by a particular government activity. These units would be 
responsible for conducting the activities. Examples of direct, ef- 
fective reciprocity arrangements in our system are the jury sys- 
37. Id. at 1192-93. 
38. S. SCHEINGOLD, THEPOLITICS OF RIGHTS 131 (1974). 
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tem and the primarily privately controlled labor-management 
relations field. Moreover, whenever possible, government activi- 
ties would be placed directly in the hands of the people.ss 
Another group that should take responsibility in facilitating 
participation is the political parties. Studies demonstrate that 
strong party leadership can account for as much as a 10 percent 
spread in voter turnout. If every state had voter registration 
laws as permissive as those of the most permissive states, turn- 
out may have increased in the 1972 presidential election by as 
much as 9 percentO4O Legislation in this area would have a real 
effect on participation. 
The above changes have promise because of man's natural 
need to get involved. Participation breeds participation. The ex- 
perience of efficacy motivates people to further action. We learn 
by doing, and if norms are learned autonomously rather than 
dictated, we come to understand and respect the reasons under- 
lying them." 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This proposed model is consistent with our Constitution. It 
cannot be criticized for violating democratic values because it 
improves the democratic process by increasing citizen 
participation. 
Professor Ely has stated two arguments that favor this 
approach: 
The first is that a representation-reinforcing approach to judi- 
cial review, unlike its rival value-protecting approach, is not in- 
consistent with, but on the contrary (and quite by design) en- 
tirely supportive of, the underlying premises of the American 
system of representative democracy. The second is that such 
an approach, again in contradistinction to its rival, involves 
tasks that courts, as experts on process and (more important) 
as political outsiders, can sensibly claim to be better qualified 
and situated to perform than political  official^.^' 
39. Examples include self-help programs and community action grants which facili- 
tate the development of cooperative movements to take over government activities. Also, 
hoine rule legislation, referendum and recall provisions, and sunshine laws can increase 
participation. 
40. Crotty, Party Effort and Its Impact on the Vote, 65 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 439 
(1974); Katz & Eldersveld, The Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the Electorate, 25 
PUB. OPINION Q. 11, 12, 24 (1961). 
41. R. WOLFINGER & S. ROSENSTONE, supra note 20, at 88. 
42. J. ELY, supra note 16, at 88. 
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The model also reserves for the courts the special role identified 
in the famous footnote 4 of United States u. Carolene Products 
Co.: 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the pre- 
sumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its 
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, 
such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed 
equally specific when held to be embraced within the 
Fourteenth. 
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation 
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be 
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to 
be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the gen- 
eral prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most 
other types of leg is la ti or^.^^ 
This model is particularly well tailored to the political situa- 
tion in the United States. Along with the high degree of aliena- 
tion present here, Almond's and Verba's filidings indicate that 
Americans voice a pervasive desire not to alter the basic prem- 
ises underlying their system: 
[Wlhen respondents were asked to mention the "things 
about this country that you are most proud of," 85% of 
Americans mentioned aspects of the political system such 
as the . Constitution, political freedom, or democracy. 
These sources of pride are all strongly associated with 
the norms of equality, responsibility, and responsiveness 
which have been suggested here as providing the point of 
reference for answers to the questions constituting this 
component. In no other country studied did even as 
many as half of the respondents mention political charac- 
teristics as a source of pride? 
Public Opinion has reported that over 70 percent of those polled 
found the political system "basically good"; 47 percent said the 
same for the system of justice; and 69 percent expressed the 
same for business and industry? 
One may thus predict that by improving on the basic prem- 
ise of democracy and by providing new opportunities for partici- 
pation, the body politic will respond positively. The solution lies 
43. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
44. Finifter, supra note 1, at 396 (quoting G. ALMOND & S. VERBA, THE CMC CUL- 
TURE 102 (1963)). 
45. PUB. OPINION, Jan./Feb. 1979, at 26. 
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in reinforcing the political process in a constructive and creative 
way.'@ 
Finally, the model is appropriate for the development of 
conviviality in our society. As Ivan Illich says: 
I choose the term "conviviality" to designate the op- 
posite of industrial productivity. I intend it to mean au- 
tonomous and creative intercourse among persons, and 
the intercourse of persons with their environment; and 
this in contrast with the conditioned response of persons 
to the demands made upon them by others, and by man- 
made environment. I consider conviviality to be individ- 
ual freedom realized in personal interdependence and, as 
such, an intrinsic ethical value. I believe that, in any soci- 
ety, as conviviality is reduced below a certain level, no 
amount of industrial productivity can effectively satisfy 
the needs it created among society's members.47 
46. See id.; Wallace, Revitalization Movements, 58 Aaa. ANTHROPOLOGIST 264 (1956). 
47. I. ~ C H ,  TOOLS FOR CONVIYIALITY 11 (19'73). 
